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Abstract
Propositional KLM-style defeasible reasoning involves a core
propositional logic capable of expressing defeasible (or con-
ditional) implications. The semantics for this logic is based
on Kripke-like structures known as ranked interpretations.
KLM-style defeasible entailment is referred to as rational
whenever the defeasible entailment relation under consider-
ation generates a set of defeasible implications all satisfying
a set of rationality postulates known as the KLM postulates.
In a recent paper Booth et al. proposed PTL, a logic that is
more expressive than the core KLM logic. They proved an
impossibility result, showing that defeasible entailment for
PTL fails to satisfy a set of rationality postulates similar in
spirit to the KLM postulates. Their interpretation of the im-
possibility result is that defeasible entailment for PTL need
not be unique.
In this paper we continue the line of research in which the
expressivity of the core KLM logic is extended. We present
the logic Boolean KLM (BKLM) in which we allow for dis-
junctions, conjunctions, and negations, but not nesting, of de-
feasible implications. Our contribution is twofold. Firstly, we
show (perhaps surprisingly) that BKLM is more expressive
than PTL. Our proof is based on the fact that BKLM can
characterise all single ranked interpretations, whereas PTL
cannot. Secondly, given that the PTL impossibility result also
applies to BKLM, we adapt the different forms of PTL entail-
ment proposed by Booth et al. to apply to BKLM.
1 Introduction
Non-monotonic reasoning has been extensively studied in
the AI literature, as it provides a mechanism for making
bold inferences that go beyond what classical methods can
provide, while retaining the possibility of revising these in-
ferences in light of new information. In their seminal pa-
per, Kraus et al. (1990) consider a general framework for
non-monotonic reasoning, phrased in terms of defeasible, or
conditional implications of the form ↵ |⇠  , to be read as
‘If ↵ holds, then typically   holds’. Importantly, they pro-
vide a set of rationality conditions, in the form of struc-
tural properties, that a reasonable form of entailment for
these conditionals should satisfy, and characterise these se-
mantically. Lehmann and Magidor (1992) also considered
the question of which entailment relations definable in the
KLM framework can be considered to be the correct ones
for non-monotonic reasoning. In general, there is a large
class of entailment relations for KLM-style logics (Casini,
Meyer, and Varzinczak 2019), and it is widely agreed upon
that there is no unique best answer. The options can be nar-
rowed down, however, and Lehmann et al. propose Ratio-
nal Closure (RC) as the minimally acceptable form of ra-
tional entailment. Rational closure is based on the principle
of presumption of typicality (Lehmann 1995), which states
that propositions should be considered typical unless there
is reason to believe otherwise. For instance, if we know
that birds typically fly, and all we know about a robin is
that it is a bird, we should tentatively conclude that it flies,
as there is no reason to believe it is atypical. While RC
is not always appropriate, there is fairly general consensus
that interesting forms of conditional reasoning should ex-
tend RC from an inferential perspective (Lehmann 1995;
Casini, Meyer, and Varzinczak 2019).
Since KLM-style logics have limited conditional expres-
sivity (see Section 2.1), there has been some work in ex-
tending the KLM constructions to more expressive logics.
Perhaps the main question is whether entailment relations
resembling RC can be defined also for more expressive log-
ics. The first investigation in such a direction was proposed
by Booth and Paris (1998) who consider an extension in
which both positive (↵ |⇠  ) and negative (↵ 6|⇠  ) con-
ditionals are allowed. Booth et al. (2013) introduce a signifi-
cantly more expressive logic called Propositional Typicality
Logic (PTL), in which propositional logic is extended with
a modal-like typicality operator •. This typicality operator
can be used anywhere in a formula, in contrast to KLM-
style logics, where typicality refers only to the antecedent of
conditionals of the form ↵ |⇠  .
The price one pays for this expressiveness is that ratio-
nal entailment becomes more difficult to pin down. This is
shown by Booth et al. (2015), who prove that several desir-
able properties of rational closure are mutually inconsistent
for PTL entailment. They interpret this as saying that the
correct form of entailment for PTL is contextual, and de-
pends on which properties are considered more important
for the task at hand.
In this paper we consider a different extension of KLM-
style logics, which we refer to as Boolean KLM (BKLM),
and in which we allow negative conditionals, as well as ar-
bitrary conjunctions and disjunctions of conditionals. We
do not allow the nesting of conditionals, though. We show,
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perhaps surprisingly, that BKLM is strictly more expressive
than PTL by exhibiting an explicit translation of PTL knowl-
edge bases into BKLM. We also prove that BKLM entail-
ment is more restrictive than PTL entailment, in the sense
that a stronger class of entailment properties are inconsis-
tent for BKLM. In particular, attempts to extend rational clo-
sure to BKLM in the manner of LM-entailment as defined by
Booth et al. (2015), are shown to be untenable.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2
we provide the relevant background on the KLM approach
to defeasible reasoning, and discuss various forms of ra-
tional entailment. We then define Propositional Typicality
Logic, and give a brief overview of the entailment problem
for PTL. In section 3 we define the logic BKLM, an exten-
sion of KLM-style logics that allows for arbitrary boolean
combinations of conditionals. We investigate the expressive-
ness of BKLM, and show that it is strictly more expressive
PTL by exhibiting an explicit translation of PTL formulas
into BKLM. In section 4 we turn to the entailment problem
for BKLM, and show that BKLM suffers from stronger ver-
sions of the known impossibility results for PTL. Section 5
discusses some related work, while section 6 concludes and
points out some future research directions.
2 Background
Let P be a set of propositional atoms, and let p, q, . . . be
meta-variables for elements of P . We write LP for the set of
propositional formulas over P , defined by ↵ ::= p | ¬↵ |
↵ ^ ↵ | > | ?. Other boolean connectives are defined as
usual in terms of ^,¬, !, and $. We write UP for the set
of valuations of P , which are functions v : P ! {0, 1}. Val-
uations are extended to LP in the usual way, and satisfaction
of a formula ↵ will be denoted v   ↵. For the remainder of
this paper we will assume that P is finite and drop super-
scripts whenever there isn’t any danger of ambiguity.
2.1 The Logic KLM
Kraus et al. (1990) study a conditional logic, which we refer
to as KLM. It is defined by assertions of the form ↵ |⇠  ,
which are read “if ↵, then typically  ”. For example, if
P = {b, f} refers to the properties of being a bird and flying
respectively, then b |⇠ f states that birds typically fly. There
are various possible semantic structures for this logic, but
in this paper we are interested in the case of rational con-
ditional assertions. The semantics for rational conditionals
is given by ranked interpretations (Lehmann and Magidor
1992). The following is an alternative, but equivalent defini-
tion of such a class of interpretations.
Definition 1. A ranked interpretation R is a function from
U to N [ {1} satisfying the following convexity condition:
if R(u) < 1, then for every 0  j < R(u), there is some
v 2 U for which R(v) = j.
Given a ranked interpretation R, we call R(u) the rank of
u with respect to R. Valuations with a lower rank are viewed
as being more typical than those with a higher rank, whereas
valuations with infinite rank are viewed as being impossibly
atypical. We refer to the set of possible valuations as UR =
2 pbf
1 pbf, pbf
0 pbf, pbf, pbf
Figure 1: A ranked interpretation over P = {p, b, f}.
{u 2 U : R(u) < 1}, and for any ↵ 2 L we define
J↵KR = {u 2 UR : u   ↵}.
Every ranked interpretation R determines a total preorder
on U in the obvious way, namely u R v iff R(u) 
R(v). Writing the strict version of this preorder as  R, it
is straightforward to show that it is modular:
Proposition 1.  R is modular, i.e. for all u, v, w 2 U ,
u  R v implies that either w  R v or u  R w.
Lehmann et al. (1992) define ranked interpretations in
terms of modular orderings on U . The following straight-
forward observation proves the equivalence of the two defi-
nitions:
Proposition 2. Let R1 and R2 be ranked interpretations.
Then R1 = R2 iff  R1= R2 .
We define satisfaction with respect to ranked interpreta-
tions as follows. Given any ↵ 2 L, we say R satisfies ↵
(written R   ↵) iff J↵KR = UR. Similarly, R satisfies a
conditional assertion ↵ |⇠   iff minRJ↵KR ✓ J KR, or in
other words iff all of the R-minimal valuations satisfying
↵ also satisfy  .
Example 1. Let R be the ranked interpretation in figure 1.
Then R satisfies p ! b, b |⇠ f and p |⇠ ¬f. Note that in our
figures we omit rank 1 for brevity, and we represent a val-
uation as a string of literals, with p indicating the negation
of the atom p.
A useful simplification is the fact that classical statements
(such as p ! b) can be viewed as special cases of condi-
tional assertions:
Proposition 3. (Kraus, Lehmann, and Magidor 1990,
p.174) For all ↵ 2 L, R   ↵ iff R   ¬↵ |⇠ ?.
In what follows we define a knowledge base as a finite set
of conditional assertions. We sometimes abuse notation by
including classical statements (of the form ↵ 2 L) in knowl-
edge bases, but in the context of Proposition 3 this should
be understood to be shorthand for the conditional assertion
¬↵ |⇠ ?. For example, the knowledge base {p ! b, b |⇠ f}
is shorthand for {¬(p ! b) |⇠ ?, b |⇠ f}.
We denote the set of all ranked interpretations over P by
RI, and we write MOD(K) for the set of ranked models of
a knowledge base K. For any U ✓ RI, we write U   ↵ to
mean R   ↵ for all R 2 U . Finally, we write sat(R) for
the set of formulas satisfied by the ranked interpretation R.
Even though KLM extends propositional logic, it is still
quite restrictive, as it only permits positive conditional as-
sertions. Booth et al. (1998) consider an extension allowing
for negative conditionals, i.e. assertions of the form ↵ 6|⇠  .
Such an assertion is satisfied by a ranked interpretation R if
and only if R 6  ↵ |⇠  .
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(REFL) K |⇡ ↵ |⇠ ↵
(LLE)
|= ↵ $  , K |⇡ ↵ |⇠  
K |⇡   |⇠  
(RW)
|=   !  , K |⇡ ↵ |⇠  
K |⇡ ↵ |⇠  
(AND)
K |⇡ ↵ |⇠  , K |⇡ ↵ |⇠  
K |⇡ ↵ |⇠   ^  
(OR)
K |⇡ ↵ |⇠  , K |⇡   |⇠  
K |⇡ ↵ _   |⇠  
(CM)
K |⇡ ↵ |⇠  , K |⇡ ↵ |⇠  
K |⇡ ↵ ^   |⇠  
(RM)
K 6|⇡ ↵ ^   |⇠  , K 6|⇡ ↵ |⇠ ¬ 
K 6|⇡ ↵ |⇠  
Figure 2: Rationality properties for defeasible entailment.
2.2 Rank Entailment
A central question in non-monotonic reasoning is determin-
ing what forms of entailment are appropriate in a defeasible
setting. Given a knowledge base K, we write K |⇡ ↵ |⇠   to
mean that K defeasibly entails ↵ |⇠  . In the literature, there
are a plethora of options available for the entailment relation
|⇡, each with their own strengths and weaknesses (Casini,
Meyer, and Varzinczak 2019). As such, it is useful to under-
stand defeasible entailment relations in terms of their global
properties. An obviously desirable property is Inclusion:
(Inclusion) K |⇡ ↵ |⇠   for all ↵ |⇠   2 K
Kraus et al. (1990) argue that a defeasible entailment re-
lation should satisfy each of the properties given in figure 2,
known as the rationality properties. We will call such rela-
tions rational.
Rational properties are essentially intertwined with the
class of ranked interpretations.
Proposition 4 (Lehmann et al. (1992)). A defeasible entail-
ment relation |⇡ is rational iff for each knowledge base K,
there is a ranked interpretation RK such that K |⇡ ↵ |⇠  
iff RK   ↵ |⇠  .
The following natural form of entailment, called rank en-
tailment, is not rational in general, as it fails to satisfy the
property of rational monotonicity (RM):
Definition 2. A conditional ↵ |⇠   is rank entailed by a
knowledge base K (written K |⇡R ↵ |⇠  ) iff R   ↵ |⇠  
for every ranked model R of K.
Despite failing to be rational, rank entailment is important
as it can be viewed as the monotonic core of an appropriate
defeasible entailment relation. In other words, the following
property is desirable:
(KLM-Ampliativity) K |⇡ ↵ |⇠   whenever K |⇡R ↵ |⇠  
Note that a rational entailment relation satisfying Inclu-
sion also satisfies KLM-Ampliativity by proposition 4.
2.3 Rational Closure
A well-known form of rational entailment for KLM is ra-
tional closure. Lehmann et al. (1992) propose rational clo-
sure as the minimum acceptable form of rational defeasi-
ble entailment, and give a syntactic characterisation of ra-
tional closure in terms of an ordering on KLM knowledge
bases. Here we refer to the semantic approach (Giordano et
al. 2015) and define rational closure in terms of an ordering
on ranked interpretations:
Definition 3. (Giordano et al. 2015, Definition 7) Given two
ranked interpretations R1 and R2, we write R1 <G R2,
that is, R1 is preferred to R2, iff R1(u) G R2(u) for every
u 2 U , and there is some v 2 U s.t. R1(v) <G R2(v).
Consider the set of models of a KLM knowledge base K.
Intuitively, the lower a model is with respect to the ordering
G, the fewer exceptional valuations it has modulo the con-
straints of K. Thus the G-minimal models can be thought
of as the semantic counterpart to the principle of typicality
seen above. This idea of making valuations as typical as pos-
sible has first been presented by Booth et al. (1998) for the
case of KLM knowledge bases with both positive and neg-
ative conditionals. For these knowledge bases, it turns out
that there is always a unique minimal model:
Proposition 5. Let K ✓ L|⇠ be a knowledge base. Then if K
is consistent, MOD(K) has a unique G-minimal element,
denoted RRCK .
The rational closure of a knowledge base can be char-
acterised as the set of formulas satisfied by this minimal
model:
Proposition 6. (Giordano et al. 2015, Theorem 2) A condi-
tional ↵ |⇠   is in the rational closure of a knowledge base
K ✓ L|⇠ (written K |⇡RC ↵ |⇠  ) iff RRCK   ↵ |⇠  .
A well-known behaviour of rational closure is the so-
called drowning effect. To make this concrete, consider the
knowledge base K = {b |⇠ f, b |⇠ w, r ! b, p ! b, p |⇠
¬f, }. This states that birds have wings and typically fly, that
robins are birds, and that penguins are birds that typically
don’t fly. Intuitively one would expect to be able to conclude
from this that robins typically have wings (r |⇠ w), since
robins are not exceptional birds. More generally, every sub-
class that does not show any exceptional behaviour should
inherit all the typical properties of a class by default. This
is the principle of the Presumption of Typicality mentioned
earlier, to which rational closure obeys. But what happens
with subclasses that are exceptional with respect to some
property?
In the above example, since penguins are exceptional only
with respect to their ability to fly, the question is whether
penguins should inherit the other typical properties of birds,
such as having wings (p |⇠ w). Rational closure does not
sanction this type of conclusion. That is, subclasses that are
exceptional with respect to a typical property of a class do
not inherit the other typical properties of the class. This is
the drowning effect which, while being a desirable form of
reasoning in some contexts, is considered a limitation if we
are interested in modelling some form of Presumption of In-
dependence (Lehmann 1995), in which a subclass inherits
all the typical properties of a class, unless there is explicit
information to the contrary. So, even though penguins are
exceptional birds in the sense of typically not being able to
fly, the Presumption of Independence requires us to conclude
that penguins typically have wings.
There are several refinements of rational closure, such
as lexicographic closure (Lehmann 1995), relevant closure
(Casini et al. 2014) and inheritance-based closure (Casini
and Straccia 2013), that satisfy both the Presumption of Typ-
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icality and the Presumption of Independence. Unlike ratio-
nal closure, lexicographic closure formalises the presump-
tive reading of ↵ |⇠  , which states that “↵ implies   un-
less there is reason to believe otherwise” (Lehmann 1995;
Casini, Meyer, and Varzinczak 2019).
2.4 Propositional Typicality Logic
The present paper investigates whether the notion of rational
closure can be extended to more expressive logics. The first
investigation in such a direction was proposed by Booth and
Paris (1998), who consider an extension of KLM in which
both positive (↵ |⇠  ) and negative (↵ 6|⇠  ) condition-
als are allowed. This additional expressiveness introduces
some technical issues, as not every such knowledge base has
a model (consider K = {↵ |⇠  ,↵ 6|⇠  }, for instance).
Nevertheless, Booth and Paris show that this is the only limit
in the validity of Proposition 5: every consistent knowledge
base in this extension has a rational closure.
Another investigated logic that extends KLM is Proposi-
tional Typicality Logic (PTL), a logic for defeasible reason-
ing proposed by Booth et al. (2015), in which propositional
logic is enriched with a modal typicality operator (denoted
•). Formulas for PTL are defined by ↵ ::= > | ? | p | •↵ |
¬↵ | ↵ ^ ↵, where p is any propositional atom. As before,
other boolean connectives are defined in terms of ¬,^, !,
$. The intuition behind a formula •↵ is that it is true for
typical instances of ↵. Note that the typicality operator can
be nested, so ↵ may itself contain some •  as a subformula.
The set of all PTL formulas is denoted L•.
Satisfaction for PTL is defined with respect to a ranked
interpretation R. Given a valuation u 2 U and formula
↵ 2 L•, we define u  R ↵ inductively in the same way
as propositional logic, with an additional rule for the typi-
cality operator: u  R •↵ if and only if u  R ↵ and there is
no v  R u such that v  R ↵. We then say that R satisfies
the formula ↵, written R   ↵, iff u  R ↵ for all u 2 UR.
Given that the typicality operator can be nested and used
anywhere within a PTL formula, one would intuitively ex-
pect PTL to be at least as expressive as KLM. The following
lemma shows that this is indeed the case:
Proposition 7 (Booth et al. (2013)). A ranked interpretation
R satisfies the KLM formula ↵ |⇠   if and only if it satisfies
the PTL formula •↵ !  .
Given two knowledge bases K1 and K2, we say they are
equivalent if they have exactly the same set of ranked mod-
els, i.e. if MOD(K1) = MOD(K2). Proposition 7 can be
rephrased as saying that every KLM knowledge base has
an equivalent PTL knowledge base. Note that the converse
doesn’t hold; there are PTL knowledge bases with no equiv-
alent in KLM:
Proposition 8 (Booth et al. (2013)). For any p 2 P , the
knowledge base K = {•p} has no equivalent KLM knowl-
edge base.
The obvious form of entailment for a PTL knowledge base
K is rank entailment (denoted |⇡R), presented earlier in def-
inition 2. As noted before, rank entailment is monotonic and
therefore inappropriate in many contexts. To pin down bet-
ter forms of PTL entailment, Booth et al. (2015) consider
the following properties, modelled after properties of ra-
tional closure, where |⇡? is a PTL entailment relation and
Cn?(K) = {↵ 2 L• : K |⇡? ↵} is its associated conse-
quence operator:
(Cumulativity) For all K1,K2 ✓ L•, if K1 ✓ K2 ✓
Cn?(K1), then Cn?(K1) = Cn?(K2).
(Ampliativity) For all K ✓ L•, CnR(K) ✓ Cn?(K).
(Strict Entailment) For all K ✓ L• and ↵ 2 L, ↵ 2
Cn?(K) iff ↵ 2 CnR(K).
(Typical Entailment) For all K ✓ L• and ↵ 2 L, •> !
↵ 2 Cn?(K) iff •> ! ↵ 2 CnR(K).
(Single Model) For all K ✓ L•, there’s some R 2
MOD(K) such that for all ↵ 2 L•, ↵ 2 Cn?(K) iff
R   ↵.
Surprisingly, it turns out that an entailment relation cannot
satisfy all of these properties simultaneously:
Proposition 9 (Booth et al. (2015)). There is no PTL en-
tailment relation |⇡? satisfying Cumulativity, Ampliativity,
Strict entailment, Typical entailment and the Single Model
property.
Booth et al. suggest that this is best interpreted as an argu-
ment for developing more than one form of PTL entailment,
which can be compared to the divide between presumptive
and prototypical readings for KLM entailment. An example
of PTL entailment is LM-entailment, which is based on the
following adaption of proposition 5:
Proposition 10 (Booth et al. (2019)). Let K ✓ L• be a con-
sistent knowledge base. Then MOD(K) has a unique G-
minimal element, denoted RLMK .
Given a knowledge base K ✓ L•, we define LM-
entailment by writing K |⇡LM ↵ iff either K is inconsis-
tent or RLMK   ↵. Booth et al. prove that LM-entailment
satisfies all of the above properties except for Strict Entail-
ment, and hence in general there may be classical statements
that are LM-entailed by K but not rank-entailed by it. Other
forms of entailment, such as PT-entailment, can be shown
to satisfy Strict Entailment but fail both Typical Entailment
and the Single Model property.
3 Boolean KLM
In section 2.1, we noted that the logic KLM is quite re-
strictive, as it allows only for positive conditional asser-
tions. As mentioned there, Booth and Paris (1998) con-
sider an extension allowing for negative conditionals, i.e.
assertions of the form ↵ 6|⇠  . Here we take that exten-
sion further, and propose Boolean KLM (BKLM), which al-
lows for arbitrary boolean combinations of conditionals, but
not for nested conditionals. BKLM formulas are defined by
A ::= ↵ |⇠   | ¬A | A^A, with other boolean connectives
defined as usual. Following Booth and Paris, we will write
↵ 6|⇠   as a synonym for ¬(↵ |⇠  ) where convenient, and
we denote the set of all BKLM formulas by Lb. So, for ex-
ample, (↵ |⇠  ) ^ (  6|⇠  ) and ¬((↵ 6|⇠  ) _ (  |⇠  )) are




Figure 3: A ranked interpretation illustrating the difference be-
tween classical disjunction and BKLM disjunction.
Satisfaction for BKLM is defined in terms of ranked inter-
pretations, by extending KLM satisfaction to boolean com-
binations of conditionals in the obvious fashion, namely
R   ¬A iff R 6  A and R   A ^ B iff R   A and
R   B. This leads to some subtle differences between
BKLM satisfaction and the other logics. For instance, care
must be taken to apply proposition 3 correctly when trans-
lating between propositional formulas and BKLM formulas.
The propositional formula p _ q translates to the BKLM
formula ¬(p _ q) |⇠ ?, and not to the BKLM formula
(¬p |⇠ ?) _ (¬q |⇠ ?), as the following example illus-
trates:
Example 2. Consider the propositional formula A = p _ q
and the BKLM formula B = (¬p |⇠ ?)_ (¬q |⇠ ?). If R is
the ranked interpretation in figure 3, then R satisfies A but
not B, as neither clause of the disjunction is satisfied.
To prevent possible confusion, we will avoid mixing clas-
sical and defeasible assertions in a BKLM knowledge base.
For similar reasons, it’s also worth noting the difference be-
tween boolean connectives in PTL and the corresponding
connectives in BKLM. By proposition 7, one might expect
a BKLM formula such as ¬(p |⇠ q) to translate into the PTL
formula ¬(•p ! q). The following example shows that this
naı̈ve approach fails:
Example 3. Consider the formulas A = ¬(•p ! q) and
B = ¬(p |⇠ q), and let R be the ranked interpretation in
figure 3. Then A is equivalent to •p^¬q, which isn’t satisfied
by R. On the other hand, R satisfies B.
One might ask whether there is a more nuanced way of
translating BKLM knowledge bases into PTL. In the next
section we answer this question in the negative, by showing
that BKLM is in fact strictly more expressive than PTL.
3.1 Expressiveness of BKLM for Ranked
Interpretations
So far we have been rather vague about what we mean by
the expressiveness of a logic. All of the logics we consider
in this paper share the same semantic structures, which pro-
vides us with a handy definition. We say that a logic can
characterise a set of ranked interpretations U ✓ RI if there
is some knowledge base K with U as its set of ranked mod-
els. Given this, we say that a logic is more expressive than
another logic if it can characterise at least as many sets of
interpretations.
Example 4. Let K ✓ L|⇠ be a KLM knowledge base. Then
its PTL translation K0 = {•↵ !   : ↵ |⇠   2 K} has
exactly the same ranked models by proposition 7, and hence
PTL is at least as expressive as KLM. Proposition 8 shows
that this comparison is strict.
In this section we show that BKLM is maximally expres-
sive, in the sense that it can characterise any set of ranked
interpretations. For a valuation u 2 U , we write û to mean
any characteristic formula of u, namely any propositional
formula such that v   û iff v = u. It is easy to see that
these always exist, as P is finite, and that all characteristic
formulas of u are logically equivalent.
Lemma 1. For any ranked interpretation R and valuations
u, v 2 U , it is straightforward to check that:
1. R   > 6|⇠ ¬û iff R(u) = 0.
2. R   û |⇠ ? iff R(u) = 1.
3. R   û _ v̂ |⇠ ¬v̂ iff u  R v or R(u) = R(v) = 1.
Note that this lemma holds even in the vacuous case
where R(u) = 1 for all u 2 U . Following Lehmann et
al. (1992), we write ↵ <   as shorthand for the defeasible
implication ↵ _   |⇠ ¬ . We now show that the concept of
characteristic formulas can be applied to ranked interpreta-
tions as well:
Lemma 2. Let R be any ranked interpretation. Then there
exists a formula ch(R) 2 Lb with R as its unique model.
Proof. Consider the following knowledge bases.
1. K  = {û < v̂ : u  R v} [ {û 6< v̂ : u 6 R v}
2. K1 = {û |⇠ ? : R(u) = 1} [ {û 6|⇠ ? : R(u) < 1}
By lemma 1, R satisfies K = K [K1. To show that it is
the unique model of K, consider any R⇤ 2 MOD(K). Since
R⇤ satisfies K1, R⇤(u) = 1 iff R(u) = 1 for any u 2 U .
Now consider any u, v 2 U , and suppose that R(u) < 1.
Then u  R v iff K  contains û < v̂. But R⇤ satisfies K ,
so this is true iff u  R⇤ v as R⇤(u) < 1. On the other
hand, if R(u) = 1, then u 6 R v and u 6 R⇤ v. Hence
 R= R⇤ , which implies that R = R⇤ by proposition 2.
We conclude the proof by letting ch(R) =
V
↵2K ↵.
We refer to ch(R) as the characteristic formula of R.
A simple application of disjunction allows us to prove the
following more general corollary:
Corollary 1. Let U ✓ RI be a set of ranked interpretations.
Then there exists a formula ch(U) 2 Lb with U as its set of
models.
This proves that BKLM is at least as expressive as PTL
since, in principle, for every PTL knowledge base there is
some BKLM knowledge base with the same set of models.
It is not clear, however, whether there is a more natural de-
scription of this knowledge base than that provided by char-
acteristic formulas. In the next section we will address this
shortcoming by describing an explicit translation from PTL
to BKLM knowledge bases.
In fact, BKLM is strictly more expressive than PTL. This
is illustrated by the knowledge base K = {(> |⇠ p)_ (> |⇠
¬p)}, which expresses the “excluded-middle” statement that
typically one of p or ¬p is true. There are two distinct G-
minimal ranked models of K, given by R1 and R2 in figure
4, and hence K cannot have an equivalent PTL knowledge
base by proposition 10.
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3.2 Translating PTL Into BKLM
In section 2.4, satisfaction for PTL formulas with respect to
a ranked interpretation R was defined in terms of the possi-
ble valuations of R. In order to define a translation operator
between PTL and BKLM, our main idea is to encode satis-
faction with respect to a valuation u 2 U in terms of an
appropriate BKLM formula. In other words, we will define
an operator tru : L• ! Lb such that for each u 2 UR,
R   tru(↵) iff u  R ↵.
Definition 4. Given ↵,  2 L•, p 2 P and u 2 U , we define
tru by structural induction as follows:
1. tru(p) def= û |⇠ p
2. tru(>) def= û |⇠ >
3. tru(?) def= û |⇠ ?
4. tru(¬↵) def= ¬tru(↵)
5. tru(↵ ^  ) def= tru(↵) ^ tru( )




(v̂ < û) ! ¬trv(↵)
i
Note that this is well-defined, as each case is defined in
terms of the translation of strict subformulas. The transla-
tions can be viewed as formal version of the definition of
PTL satisfaction - case 6 states that •↵ is satisfied by a pos-
sible valuation u iff u is a minimal valuation satisfying ↵,
for instance.
Lemma 3. Let R be a ranked interpretation, and u 2 UR
a valuation with R(u) < 1. Then for all ↵ 2 L• we have
R   tru(↵) if and only if u  R ↵.
Proof. We will prove the result by structural induction on
the cases in definition 4:
1. Suppose that R   tru(p), i.e. R   û |⇠ p. This is true
iff u |= p, which is equivalent by definition to u  R p.
Cases 2 and 3 are similar.
4. Suppose that R   tru(¬↵), i.e. R   ¬tru(↵). This is
true iff R 6  tru(↵), which by the induction hypothesis is
equivalent to u 6 R ↵. But this is equivalent to u  R ¬↵
by definition. Case 5 is similar.
6. Suppose there exists an ↵ 2 L• such that R   tru(•↵)
but u 6 R •↵. Then either u 6 R ↵, which by the induc-
tion hypothesis is a contradiction since R   tru(↵), or
there is some v 2 U with v  R u such that v  R ↵.
But by lemma 1, v  R u is true only if R   v̂ < û. We
also have, by the induction hypothesis, that R   trv(↵)
since v  R ↵. Hence R   (v̂ < û) ^ trv(↵), which im-
plies that one of the clauses in tru(•↵) is false. This is a
contradiction, so we conclude that R   tru(•↵) implies
u  R •↵.
Conversely, suppose that u  R •↵. Then u  R ↵, and
hence R   tru(↵) by the induction hypothesis. We also
have that if v  R u then v 6 R ↵, which is equivalent to
R   ¬trv(↵) by the induction hypothesis. But by lemma
1, v  R u iff R   v̂ < û. We conclude that R   (v̂ <
û) ! ¬trv(↵) for all v 2 U , and hence R   tru(•↵).
A formula ↵ 2 L• is satisfied by a ranked interpretation
R iff it is satisfied by every possible valuation of R. We can
combine the translation operators of definition 4 to formalise
this statement as follows:




(û 6|⇠ ?) ! tru(↵)
⌘
All that remains is to check that this formula correctly
encodes PTL satisfaction:
Lemma 4. For all ↵ 2 L•, a ranked model R satisfies ↵ if
and only if it satisfies tr(↵).
Proof. Suppose R   ↵. Then for all u 2 U , either R(u) =
1 or u  R ↵. The former implies R   û |⇠ ? by lemma
1, and the latter implies R   tru(↵) by lemma 3. Thus R  
(û 6|⇠ ?) ! tru(↵) for all u 2 U , which proves R   tr(↵)
as required.
Conversely, suppose R   tr(↵). Then for any u 2 U ,
either R   û |⇠ ? and hence R(u) = 1 by lemma 1, or
R   û 6|⇠ ? and hence R   tru(↵) by hypothesis. But then
R   ↵ by lemma 3.
4 Entailment Results for BKLM
We now turn to the question of defeasible entailment for
BKLM knowledge bases. As in previous cases, an obvious
approach to this is rank entailment, which we define in the
usual fashion:
Definition 6. Given any K ✓ Lb and A 2 Lb, we say K
rank entails A (written K |⇡R A) iff R   A for all R 2
MOD(K).
Being monotonic, rank entailment serves as a useful lower
bound for defeasible BKLM entailment, but cannot be con-
sidered a good solution in its own right. Letting |⇡? be an
entailment relation and Cn? its associated consequence oper-
ator, consider the entailment properties in section 2.4 in the
context of BKLM. Our first observation is that the premises
of proposition 9 can be weakened as a consequence of global
disjunction:
Lemma 5. There is no BKLM entailment relation |⇡? satis-
fying Ampliativity, Typical Entailment and the Single Model
property.
Proof. Suppose that |⇡? is such an entailment relation, and
consider the knowledge base K = {(> |⇠ p) _ (> |⇠ ¬p)}.
Both interpretations in figure 4, R1 and R2, are models of K.
R1 satisfies > |⇠ p and not > |⇠ ¬p, whereas R2 satisfies
> |⇠ ¬p and not > |⇠ p. Thus, by the Typical Entailment
property, K 6|⇡? > |⇠ p and K 6|⇡? > |⇠ ¬p. On the other
hand, by Ampliativity we get K |⇡? (> |⇠ p)_(> |⇠ ¬p). A
single ranked interpretation cannot satisfy all three of these
assertions, however, and hence no such entailment relation
can exist.
In the PTL context, LM-entailment satisfies Ampliativ-
ity, Typical Entailment and the Single Model property. Thus
lemma 5 is a concrete sense in which BKLM entailment is
more constrained than PTL entailment. This raises an in-
teresting question - can we nevertheless define a notion of








Figure 4: Ranked models of K = {(> |⇠ p) _ (> |⇠ ¬p)}.
and LM-entailment, by giving up one of the above proper-
ties? In order to guarantee a rational entailment relation, it
is desirable to keep the Single Model property in view of
proposition 4. For the rest of this section we will investi-
gate the consequences of this choice, and show that while it
is possible to satisfy the Single Model property for BKLM
entailment, the resulting entailment relations are heavily re-
stricted.
4.1 Order Entailments
As we have seen in Section 2.3, rational closure can be mod-
eled as a form of minimal model entailment. In other words,
given a knowledge base K, we can construct the rational clo-
sure of K by placing an appropriate ordering on its set of
ranked models (in this case G), and picking out the con-
sequences of the minimal ones. In this section we formalise
this notion of entailment, with a view towards understanding
the Single Model property for BKLM.
Definition 7. Let < be a strict partial order on RI. Then for
all knowledge bases K and formulas ↵, we define K |⇡< ↵
iff R   ↵ for all <-minimal elements of MOD(K).
The relation |⇡< will be referred to as the order entail-
ment relation of <. Note that we have been deliberately
vague about which logic we are dealing with, as the con-
struction works identically for KLM, PTL and BKLM. It is
also worth mentioning that the set of models of a consistent
knowledge base always has <-minimal elements, as we have
assumed finiteness of P , that implies a finite set of ranked
interpretations.
Example 5. By definition 6, the rational closure of any KLM
knowledge base K is the set of formulas satisfied by the
(unique) <G-minimal element of MOD(K). Thus rational
closure is the order entailment relation of <G over KLM.
In general, order entailment relations satisfy all of the
rationality properties in figure 2 except for rational mono-
tonicity (RM). Rational monotonicity holds, for instance, if
MOD(K) has a unique <-minimal model for every knowl-
edge base K. This is the case for rational closure and LM-
entailment, which both satisfy the Single Model property.
The following proposition follows easily from the defini-
tions, and shows that this is typical:
Proposition 11. An order entailment relation |⇡< satisfies
the Single Model property iff MOD(K) has a unique <-
minimal model for every knowledge base K.
A class of order entailment relations for which the Single
Model property always holds are the total order entailment
relations, i.e. those |⇡< corresponding to a total order <.
Intuitively, this is a strong restriction, as an a priori total or-
dering over all possible ranked interpretations is unnatural in
the context of an agent’s knowledge. For BKLM entailment,
it turns out that there is a partial converse to this discussion,
which we will prove in the next section.
4.2 The Single Model Property
In this section we prove that, under some mild assumptions,
a BKLM entailment relation satisfying the Single Model
property is always equivalent to a total order entailment re-
lation.
Theorem 1. Suppose |⇡? is a BKLM entailment relation
satisfying Cumulativity, Ampliativity and the Single Model
property. Then |⇡?=|⇡<, where |⇡< is a total order entail-
ment relation.
For the remainder of the section, consider a fixed BKLM
entailment relation |⇡? (with associated consequence oper-
ator Cn?), and suppose that |⇡? satisfies Cumulativity, Am-
pliativity and the Single Model property. In what follows, we
will move between the entailment relation and consequence
operator notations freely as convenient. To begin with, we
note the following straightforward lemma:
Lemma 6. For any knowledge base K ✓ Lb, Cn?(K) =
CnR(Cn?(K)) = Cn?(CnR(K)).
Our approach to proving theorem 1 is to assign a unique
index ind(R) 2 N to each ranked interpretation R 2 RI,
and then show that Cn?(K) corresponds to minimisation of
index in MOD(K). To construct this indexing scheme, con-
sider the following algorithm:
1. Set M0 := RI, i := 0.
2. If Mi = ;, terminate.
3. By corollary 1, there is some knowledge base Ki ✓ Lb
such that MOD(Ki) = Mi.
4. By the single model property, there is some Ri 2 Mi such
that Cn?(Ki) = sat(Ri).
5. Set Mi+1 := Mi \ {Ri}, i := i+ 1.
6. Go to step 2, and iterate until termination.
This algorithm is guaranteed to terminate as M0 is finite
and 0  |Mi+1| < |Mi|. Note that once the algorithm ter-
minates, for each R 2 RI there will have been a unique
i 2 N such that R = Ri. We will call this i the index of
R, and denote it by ind(R). Given a knowledge base K, we
define ind(K) = min{ind(R) : R 2 MOD(K)} to be the
minimum index of the knowledge base.
For clarity, when we write Rn, Kn and Mn in the follow-
ing lemmas, we mean the ranked interpretations, knowledge
bases and sets of models constructed in steps 3 to 5 of the
algorithm when i = n:
Lemma 7. Given any knowledge base K ✓ Lb, MOD(K) ✓
Mn, where n = ind(K).
Proof. An easy induction on step 5 of the algorithm proves
that Mn = {R 2 RI : ind(R)   n}. By hypothesis,
ind(R)   n for all R 2 MOD(K), and hence MOD(K) ✓
Mn.
The following lemma proves that entailment under |⇡?
corresponds to minimisation of index:
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Lemma 8. Given any knowledge base K ✓ Lb, Cn?(K) =
sat(Rn), where n = ind(K).
Proof. For all A, Kn |⇡R A iff R   A for all R 2
MOD(Kn) = Mn. But by lemma 7, MOD(K) ✓ Mn
and hence CnR(Kn) ✓ CnR(K). On the other hand,
Rn 2 MOD(K) by hypothesis and hence Rn   A
for all A 2 K. By the definition of step 4 of the al-
gorithm we have sat(Rn) = Cn?(Kn), and thus K ✓
Cn?(Kn). Applying CnR to each side of this inclusion (us-
ing the monotonicity of rank entailment), we get CnR(K) ✓
CnR(Cn?(Kn)) = Cn?(Kn), with the last equality fol-
lowing from lemma 6. Putting it all together, we have
CnR(Kn) ✓ CnR(K) ✓ Cn?(Kn), and hence by Cumu-
lativity we conclude Cn?(K) = Cn?(Kn) = sat(Rn).
Consider the strict partial order on RI defined by R1 <
R2 iff ind(R1) < ind(R2). By construction, the index of a
ranked interpretation is unique, and hence < is total. It fol-
lows from lemma 8 that |⇡?=|⇡<, and hence |⇡? is equiva-
lent to a total order entailment relation. This completes the
proof of theorem 1.
5 Related Work
The most relevant work w.r.t. the present paper is that of
Booth and Paris (1998) in which they define rational closure
for the extended version of KLM for which negated condi-
tionals are allowed, and the work on PTL (Booth et al. 2015;
Booth et al. 2019). The relation this work has with BKLM
was investigated in detail throughout the paper.
Delgrande (1987) proposes a logic that is as expressive as
BKLM. The entailment relation he proposes is different from
the minimal entailment relations we consider here and, given
the strong links between our constructions and the KLM ap-
proach, the remarks in the comparison made by Lehmann
and Magidor (1992, Section 3.7) are also applicable here.
Boutilier (1994) defines a family of conditional logics
using preferential and ranked interpretations. His logic is
closer to ours and even more expressive, since nesting of
conditionals is allowed, but he too does not consider min-
imal constructions. That is, both Delgrande and Boutilier’s
approaches adopt a Tarskian-style notion of consequence,
in line with rank entailment. The move towards a non-
monotonic notion of defeasible entailment was precisely our
motivation in the present work.
Giordano et al. (2010) propose the system Pmin which is
based on a language that is as expressive as PTL. However,
they end up using a constrained form of such a language that
goes only slightly beyond the expressivity of the language
of KLM-style conditionals (their well-behaved knowledge
bases). Also, the system Pmin relies on preferential mod-
els and a notion of minimality that is closer to circumscrip-
tion (McCarthy 1980).
In the context of description logics, Giordano et al. (2007;
2015) propose to extend the conditional language with an
explicit typicality operator T (·), with a meaning that is
closely related to the PTL operator •. It is worth pointing
out, though, that most of the analysis in the work of Gior-
dano et al. is dedicated to a constrained use of the typicality
operator T (·) that does not go beyond the expressivity of a
KLM-style conditional language, but revised, of course, for
the expressivity of description logics.
In the context of adaptive logics, Straßer (2014) de-
fines the logic R+ as an extension of KLM in which arbi-
trary boolean combinations of defeasible implications are al-
lowed, and the set of propositional atoms has been extended
to include the symbols {li : i 2 N}. Semantically, these
symbols encode rank in the object language, in the sense that
u   li in a ranked interpretation R iff R(u)   i. Straßer’s
interest in R+ is to define an adaptive logic ALCS that pro-
vides a dynamic proof theory for rational closure, whereas
our interest in BKLM is to generalise rational closure to more
expressive extensions of KLM. Nevertheless, the Minimal
Abnormality Strategy (see the work of Batens (2007), for
instance) for ALCS is closely related to LM -entailment as
defined in this paper.
6 Conclusion
The main focus of this paper is exploring the connection be-
tween expressiveness and entailment for extensions of the
core logic KLM. Accordingly, we introduce the logic BKLM,
an extension of KLM that allows for arbitrary boolean com-
binations of defeasible implications. We take an abstract ap-
proach to the analysis of BKLM, and show that it is strictly
more expressive than existing extensions of KLM such as
PTL (Booth, Meyer, and Varzinczak 2013) and KLM with
negation (Booth and Paris 1998). Our primary conclusion is
that a logic as expressive as BKLM has to give up several
desirable properties for defeasible entailment, most notably
the Single Model property, and thus appealing forms of en-
tailment for PTL such as LM-entailment (Booth et al. 2015)
cannot be lifted to the BKLM case.
For future work, an obvious question is what forms of de-
feasible entailment are appropriate for BKLM. For instance,
is it possible to skirt the impossibility results proven in this
paper while still retaining the KLM rationality properties?
Other forms of entailment for PTL, such as PT-entailment,
have also yet to be analysed in the context of BKLM and
may be better suited to such an expressive logic.
Another line of research to be explored is whether there
is a more natural translation of PTL formulas into BKLM
than that defined in this paper. Our translation is based on a
direct encoding of PTL semantics, and consequently results
in an exponential blow-up in the size of the formulas being
translated. It is clear that there are much more efficient ways
to translate specific PTL formulas, but we leave it as an open
problem whether this can be done in general. In a similar
vein, it is interesting to ask how PTL could be extended in
order to make it equiexpressive with BKLM.
Finally, it may be interesting to compare BKLM with an
extension of KLM that allows for nested defeasible impli-
cations, i.e. formulas such as ↵ |⇠ (  |⇠  ). While such an
extension cannot be more expressive than BKLM, at least for
a semantics given by ranked interpretations, it may provide
more natural encodings of various kinds of typicality, and
thus be easier to work with from a pragmatic point of view.
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